

Battery Depletion Attack through Packet Injection on IoT Thread Mesh Network

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<https://github.com/SystronLab/ThreadBatteryAttack/>




Abstract

In the rapidly expanding landscape of Internet of Things (IoT) device manufacturing and deployment, concerns about security have become prominent. This demonstration involves practical attacks on a thread-mesh network within a controlled environment, exploiting vulnerabilities in various components of the Thread network stack. Our attack vectors successfully identified nearby Thread networks and devices by gathering 2-byte Personal Area Network ID (PAN ID) and device frequency information, serving as reconnaissance for potential additional attacks. The focus was on investigating susceptibility to replay attacks and packet injection into thread-mesh networks. Although the experiment attempted to capture thread packets to emulate an authorised sender, the cryptographic encryption and sequence numbers employed for integrity checks resulted in packet rejection by the network. Despite this, our successful injection of packets highlights the potential for battery depletion attacks.


Thread Network Setup

Setting Up a Border Router: A Raspberry Pi 3B is connected to an nRF52840 USB dongle to operate the OpenThread border router software, which is freely accessible from OpenThread. Google introduced OpenThread (openthread.io) as an open-source implementation of Thread, aiming to enhance the accessibility of networking technology used in Google Nest products for a wider developer audience. This move seeks to expedite the development of products for connected homes and commercial buildings. With a concise platform abstraction layer and a small memory footprint, OpenThread (OT) is highly portable, supporting both System-on-Chip (SoC) and Co-Processor (RCP, NCP) designs. The Border Router functions as the external gateway for the Thread network, establishing a connection between the Thread network and other IP-based networks like Wi-Fi or Ethernet. Additionally, it facilitates the formation of a Thread network and supports external commissioning, enabling the seamless addition of new devices to the Thread network using a phone app. Moreover, it offers features to display a network diagram and provide valuable information about the network.



The diagram depicts simplified blocks of a Thread network.

Forming a Thread Network: A network can be created through a web interface on the Border Router. The procedure involves specifying a network name and a passphrase. The passphrase is used to generate the Pre-Shared Key for the Commissioner (PSKc), enabling an external commissioning device to authenticate and commission new devices onto the network.




The border router web interface.


Commissioning a New Device: The method employed for commissioning new devices onto the Thread Network is known as external commissioning. In this process, a device that is not part of the Thread network commissions new devices onto the network using various methods, such as the command line or a phone app. Additionally, it is possible to commission a new device without an external commissioner, a method known as On-Mesh Commissioning. However, using the app proved to be more straightforward and convenient, eliminating the need for manually running a set of commands.

An external device, not part of the Thread network, can add a device to the Thread network by authenticating with the Border

Router using the PSKc key generated during the network formation. The commissioner then conveys the details of the new device to the border router, which initiates a connection to the new device using Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) and adds it to the network by sharing the network key.



The figure shows how an external commissioning device interacts with the Thread network.



The OpenThread Commissioner Android App.




nRF52840 DK used as a Thread node, with its QR code to allow it to be commissioned onto the network.

```
v=1&&eui=<new device Extended Unique Identifier>&&cc=<passphrase>
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The extended unique identifier (EUI) of the device can be obtained by running the command "eui64" on the new device when connected over serial. Once the QR code is scanned, the app will wait for the device to complete the joining process. This step must be manually completed through the command line on the new device by enabling the network interface (ifconfig up) and initiating the join process (joiner start < passphrase >). Afterward, wait a few minutes to receive a success message both on the command line and in the app. To connect the device to the Thread network, simply execute the command 'thread start'.


Replay and Battery Depletion Attack Setup




The diagram illustrates the experimental network configuration at Systron Lab. It features nRF52840 Development Kits (https://www.nordicsemi.com/Products/nRF52840) as Thread nodes and a Border Router, consisting of a Raspberry Pi connected to an nRF52840 USB dongle, for establishing a Thread mesh network. The Border Router interfaces with an eero gateway. All Nordic Development kits communicate wirelessly via IEEE 802.15.4, with USB connections to laptops/computers exclusively used for serial connections. An nRF52840 connected to a PC acts as a sniffer. Network scanning and packet injection for conducting attacks are carried out using the Sewio OpenSniffer. Please note that both the packet sniffer and packet injector exist externally to the network.





Results



Open Sniffer Packet Injection Setting.



We observe the UDP packet 3, which we captured earlier, being successfully replayed into the network as packet number 11.



Acknowledgment

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